Vitalisms and the language of "bullshit"
Quite the most entertaining of academic papers is 'On the reception and detection of pseudo profound bullshit' by Pennycook at al and published in the Journal of Judgement and Decision making. Together with another by Wenzhong & Jingyi, titled A Pragmatic Study on the Functions of Vague Language in Commercial Advertising (itself a translation from Mandarin to English) it helps illustrate the 'natural use' and difficulties of obscure language, and it's spread along with the rapid rise in speed of communication. We can use 'shrinking world', a technically meaningless and imprecise, but metaphorically very useful phrase, to describe the effect of increasing human population on a finite planet for the very reason that it cannot be taken literally. Yes, the planet is cooling and this involves some shrinking of the crust but only over colossal lengths of time. So to then interpret the phrase 'shrinking planet' as anything other than a reference to increases in communication due to population growth and technological advances is obscuring. To confuse the two is to allow for just that - incomprehension that feels exactly like knowledge. Communication depends upon a clear and transparent discourse unless the objective (whether explicit or not) is to maintain bias, or deceive and merely sell product be it an object or idea.
"Optimal control has been a useful metaphor for understanding some superficial aspects of
motor psychophysics." (Loeb)
If I claim that there is a vitalistic quality to biology it can be taken both figuratively and literally, as if vitalism could be metaphorical but just as probably a valid explanation of biology itself. 'Vitalism' originally carried only a 'supernatural' (and vague) connotation that life was literally due to a spirit/soul/invisible essence/etc. It was a proposed theory, or assumed explanation for why biology worked. The problem, or rather fact, is that no aspect of biology has ever been explained super-naturally. Open a text and you will not find a chapter which describes the manner in which anything that could be called a 'vitalism' drives cell division, the Krebs Cycle or neurological reflexes. What you will find are natural descriptions. That supernatural beliefs are popular only confirms that intuition (a cognitive reflex in itself) in isolation cannot actually determine what is true. In philosophical terms our emotional hunches do not provide a reliable method or epistemology for solving questions about reality.
But all one need do to allow such lack of precision to continue is to be unaware of or indifferent to the importance of natural language and the challenge of the lazy, and apparently innocuous use of "bullshit". 'Optimal control or potential' has an intuitively appealing quality. It's feels easy to understand in fact it feels just like a complete explanation. Who wouldn't be compelled to regard it as also being a succinct and accurate description of biological function? But is it a real thing? Optimal is defined as 'best or most favourable' but what is that precisely? And do we even observe biology functioning in this manner - optimally - as if there is always one best way or process by which biology deals with its internal and external environments? Some authors have offered that they like to conflate terms such as 'vitalism' with 'homeostasis'. The problem here is that homeostasis refers to the tendency for biology to seek equilibrium. It is descriptive of real events which we can further investigate and observe. Conversely, it is only the adjective 'vital' that remains contemporary (as in 'vital signs') whereas vitalism (as a noun) never advanced beyond being intuitively appealing. Homeostasis is not perfection (vitalisms are), it is a 'tendency' to avoid extremes since that would cause injury and death in biological systems. The distinction is consequential - vitalism can be defined as an implied supernatural (un-locatable, invisible entity). Homeostasis describes the locatable, the visible. Vitalism is assumed to be descriptive but only homeostasis is. Using two words, one of which describes the characteristics of independently verifiable (observable) phenomena, the other which cannot, is at best naive but in reality is unavoidably misleading. And to think that the matter is based upon nothing more than illiteracy, poor grammar (Vitalism (noun), Vital (not a noun)) is extraordinary. The reason why 'natural use' language is overwhelmingly employed by marketing and advertising (and, interestingly, authoritarianism) is not to accurately communicate and foster knowledge building, it is to appeal to emotions (a function of the evolutionarily older and physically lower brain). This tends to circumvent thinking altogether. Speech, and the ideas we strap to it can still be used as a remarkably effective thinking tool if, and only when, an individual is aware of the importance of language; when we are aware that metaphor and parable can just as easily assist candor and the capacity to reason as disrupt it altogether by feeling like the real thing, a real explanation.
But all one need do to allow such lack of precision to continue is to be unaware of or indifferent to the importance of natural language and the challenge of the lazy, and apparently innocuous use of "bullshit". 'Optimal control or potential' has an intuitively appealing quality. It's feels easy to understand in fact it feels just like a complete explanation. Who wouldn't be compelled to regard it as also being a succinct and accurate description of biological function? But is it a real thing? Optimal is defined as 'best or most favourable' but what is that precisely? And do we even observe biology functioning in this manner - optimally - as if there is always one best way or process by which biology deals with its internal and external environments? Some authors have offered that they like to conflate terms such as 'vitalism' with 'homeostasis'. The problem here is that homeostasis refers to the tendency for biology to seek equilibrium. It is descriptive of real events which we can further investigate and observe. Conversely, it is only the adjective 'vital' that remains contemporary (as in 'vital signs') whereas vitalism (as a noun) never advanced beyond being intuitively appealing. Homeostasis is not perfection (vitalisms are), it is a 'tendency' to avoid extremes since that would cause injury and death in biological systems. The distinction is consequential - vitalism can be defined as an implied supernatural (un-locatable, invisible entity). Homeostasis describes the locatable, the visible. Vitalism is assumed to be descriptive but only homeostasis is. Using two words, one of which describes the characteristics of independently verifiable (observable) phenomena, the other which cannot, is at best naive but in reality is unavoidably misleading. And to think that the matter is based upon nothing more than illiteracy, poor grammar (Vitalism (noun), Vital (not a noun)) is extraordinary. The reason why 'natural use' language is overwhelmingly employed by marketing and advertising (and, interestingly, authoritarianism) is not to accurately communicate and foster knowledge building, it is to appeal to emotions (a function of the evolutionarily older and physically lower brain). This tends to circumvent thinking altogether. Speech, and the ideas we strap to it can still be used as a remarkably effective thinking tool if, and only when, an individual is aware of the importance of language; when we are aware that metaphor and parable can just as easily assist candor and the capacity to reason as disrupt it altogether by feeling like the real thing, a real explanation.
In the 2012 paper titled 'Optimal isn't good enough', Loeb discusses the limits of applying exactly the same engineering models directly to biological systems. This is often taken as an explicit argument for why we should regard vitalism as if it were explanatory. If we are attached to the belief that biology is explained supernaturally or semi-supernaturally Loeb's comments seem to refute mechanism/materialism or at the very least provide a gap into which we can inject the assumption. But it does the oppostite. Loeb is pointing out that the machinery of biology doesn't operate (exactly) like the machinery of cranes, bridges and spacecraft, not because living things possess a special extra something but because they are vastly more complex. Vitalism won't explain why, biology does. Hawk and others have been convinced of this very argument claiming that the strength of a vitalistic assertion, and therefore its ability to 'compete' or 'duel' with other 'worldviews' (ontology's/beliefs), is, oddly, not due to the power of any argument for vitalism but the inability of a material approach to be perfect. But it's because biology is imperfect that it uses 'good enough' (a variety of possible responses or reflexes) and not 'optimal' solutions. The assumed 'value' or 'balance' of vitalism is a type of 'gaps' argument, that if we do not know everything it can be explained by pretending to have an explanation (which can't, in itself, actually be described).
Another simple question is to ask if generations have not merely been tricked by a false dichotomy. 'There are always two sides to every problem' may well be the easy thought (a rapid mental shortcut) but as an idea it only represents a primitive and narrow 'battle' analogy. On second glance it isn't true of most complex problems, arguments or questions that only two views exist. Even at the junction of a T intersection the typical, pragmatic choice might be left or right. But we could reverse, get out, scale a ladder, stop and camp or dig a hole. The point is that dichotomies are often true (either ghosts are real or not) but often false and only cloud comprehension. The claim itself (only two sides (IE two extremes)) is what a majority feel is a compelling way to view the world. The same can be said for another easy claim, relativism (which follows from a false dichotomy), that because it appears as though there are multiple opinions (and only two extremes) that all views (except the assumed 'extremes' of course (which are rarely examined in detail)) represents a valid claim, as in 'everyone has their own truth/reality'. It's true that we have multiple beliefs but it is not true that there are multiple equally valid ways to determine what is 'knowledge'. That is how we end up with multiple alternative 'facts'. If it was true that knowledge can be built in a variety of ways we would observe that teaching children to cross busy roads using a range of disparate strategies all worked as well as each other (or we'd observe that it was impossible to determine or discern between them). A problem solving method which only sought to split a problem into two or many is not a method anyone would use if the potential consequences of making mistakes were serious. Want to cross a road? You have two choices - one of two methods or one of many. Is this how we approach serious problems? Nevertheless it is often the method chosen. If we look a little closer, the claim of a false dichotomy and relativism go hand in hand. If my audience is not convinced that only two choices exist (if they feel this is not entirely satisfactory) I can also claim that the variety of choices is so vast that each individual has no option but to accept any claim (such as there are only two choices (which are extreme) as well as the one I want everyone to accept. The '2 extremes' argument provides excellent cover for poorly constructed reasoning. 2 extremes divided by many possible types of knowledge results in indecision, inertia and confusion. The entire argument is asinine, condescending and dangerous while appearing egalitarian and safe. It looks remarkably like Chritopher Hitchens Principles of Inaction; The Wedge, Dangerous Precedent and Unripe Time.
Passing Bucks and Burdens
There is a very straightforward principle in philosophy called the burden of proof, as much moral as it is method. It exists as soon as a claim is made (in this case that vitalism describes something real) and only ends if the person who made the claim can provide sufficient evidence. If I claim that I see ghosts I have the burden to prove the claim. I cannot do that by making another separate claim that other people can't see what I believe I know is real. It is also technically a type of 'evidence' to cite the popularity of a claim but not one with weight to it. Appeal is not robust. Moreover if the well favoured claim is also absurd it falls even lower on the pyramid of authentication. It is a popular belief that a person named Jesus died and then came back to life. Yet no such claim can actually be authenticated by anything other than similarly popular and unjustified beliefs. And ignoring this fact is refusing to accept any responsibility at all for making what is obviously just a false claim. "I flew yesterday" sits in the same category and should be treated by philosophy in the same manner - ignored.
Single ideas or assertions (and those who pose them) have to justify themselves. They cannot borrow, loan or steal legitimacy by suggesting that other ideas are less than perfect. Another variety of not accepting responsibility is called a Tu quo que, a 'You-too!' response, a tactic often used by spouses, politicians and irascible children to evade criticism by casting ones own. Why should I address my own inadequacies if I can give the impression that others are just as incapable as I? Almost no philosopher claims that mechanistic models are perfect or that 'science can know everything' and I can't recall any but the overtly delusional who claim it has no utility. Moreover Francis Crick's claim that 'vitalism' would die was also just hyperbole. He meant to say that the concept has no validity but vitalism is a supernatural concept, a belief, a product (for all we know) of what psychology has labelled 'magical thinking'. It can never 'die' because it never 'lived' in the first place. This projection, ironically, is part of the naturally selected cognitive ability to produce causal links between our ideas and reality. It's how a mind naturally thinks and is also what philosophy calls a causal (logical) fallacy. It is obsessive compulsive disorders 'thought action fusion' or Dennett's philosophically elaborated 'intentional stance'. 'I see this and feel that, therefore this caused that.' And since what a human feels is their own intentions we project or inject imaginary intentions into the rest of reality. Things are not just uncertain or somewhat random, fate, the Universe and its (suspiciously human like) Cause has actual (mysterious) plans for me. There's a Hand of God or one of my favourites, a 'Fickle Finger (of Fate)'. Mountains 'move' in reaction to belief (faith) which rather beggars the question as to why it can't weather a few simple criticisms (or cartoons). But I digress...
This trait allows us the Fast Thinking, the heuristic mental shortcutting described by Kahneman and Tversky together with the enjoyment of theatre, the use of metaphor, story and song. It's what permits us to be 'lost within' imagined worlds or 'carried away' by emotion. It can also lead to considerable bias and the production of beliefs unsupported by anything but the belief itself. It is why we have a not entirely unique but increased ability to mimic, negotiate, lie and deceive. Cognition's tendency towards confirmation (overconfidence effects) can leverage the probability of short term success and produce dogmatism, the 'heels in the dirt' response to the very attitude of critical thinking. 'Perfect theories' do not require intellectual flexibility or revision of belief in accord with compelling evidence. They need to avoid it. What seems to be actually duelling or competing with vitalism is a function of the evolutionarily newer executive centres of the brains cortex, thinking itself. The belief in vitalism only requires the defence of preexisting intuitively naive but compelling feelings confirmed by the same overwhelming emotion and the abandonment of reason and even imagination. Vitalism requires a 'child's' mind.
Another simple question is to ask if generations have not merely been tricked by a false dichotomy. 'There are always two sides to every problem' may well be the easy thought (a rapid mental shortcut) but as an idea it only represents a primitive and narrow 'battle' analogy. On second glance it isn't true of most complex problems, arguments or questions that only two views exist. Even at the junction of a T intersection the typical, pragmatic choice might be left or right. But we could reverse, get out, scale a ladder, stop and camp or dig a hole. The point is that dichotomies are often true (either ghosts are real or not) but often false and only cloud comprehension. The claim itself (only two sides (IE two extremes)) is what a majority feel is a compelling way to view the world. The same can be said for another easy claim, relativism (which follows from a false dichotomy), that because it appears as though there are multiple opinions (and only two extremes) that all views (except the assumed 'extremes' of course (which are rarely examined in detail)) represents a valid claim, as in 'everyone has their own truth/reality'. It's true that we have multiple beliefs but it is not true that there are multiple equally valid ways to determine what is 'knowledge'. That is how we end up with multiple alternative 'facts'. If it was true that knowledge can be built in a variety of ways we would observe that teaching children to cross busy roads using a range of disparate strategies all worked as well as each other (or we'd observe that it was impossible to determine or discern between them). A problem solving method which only sought to split a problem into two or many is not a method anyone would use if the potential consequences of making mistakes were serious. Want to cross a road? You have two choices - one of two methods or one of many. Is this how we approach serious problems? Nevertheless it is often the method chosen. If we look a little closer, the claim of a false dichotomy and relativism go hand in hand. If my audience is not convinced that only two choices exist (if they feel this is not entirely satisfactory) I can also claim that the variety of choices is so vast that each individual has no option but to accept any claim (such as there are only two choices (which are extreme) as well as the one I want everyone to accept. The '2 extremes' argument provides excellent cover for poorly constructed reasoning. 2 extremes divided by many possible types of knowledge results in indecision, inertia and confusion. The entire argument is asinine, condescending and dangerous while appearing egalitarian and safe. It looks remarkably like Chritopher Hitchens Principles of Inaction; The Wedge, Dangerous Precedent and Unripe Time.
"... the principles, or rules of inaction ... are as follows:
The Principle of the Wedge is that you should not act justly now for fear of raising expectations that you may act still more justly in the future — expectations that you are afraid you will not have the courage to satisfy.
... The Principle of the Dangerous Precedent is that you should not now do any admittedly right action for fear you, or your equally timid successors, should not have the courage to do right in some future case, which ex hypothesi, is essentially different, but superficially resembles the present one. Every public action that is not customary, either is wrong, or, if it is right, is a dangerous precedent. It follows that nothing should ever be done for the first time.
Another argument is that "the Time is not Ripe." The Principle of Unripe Time is that people should not do at the present moment what they think right at that moment, because the moment at which they think it right has not yet arrived. (p. 45 Letters to a Young Contrarian)
Passing Bucks and Burdens
There is a very straightforward principle in philosophy called the burden of proof, as much moral as it is method. It exists as soon as a claim is made (in this case that vitalism describes something real) and only ends if the person who made the claim can provide sufficient evidence. If I claim that I see ghosts I have the burden to prove the claim. I cannot do that by making another separate claim that other people can't see what I believe I know is real. It is also technically a type of 'evidence' to cite the popularity of a claim but not one with weight to it. Appeal is not robust. Moreover if the well favoured claim is also absurd it falls even lower on the pyramid of authentication. It is a popular belief that a person named Jesus died and then came back to life. Yet no such claim can actually be authenticated by anything other than similarly popular and unjustified beliefs. And ignoring this fact is refusing to accept any responsibility at all for making what is obviously just a false claim. "I flew yesterday" sits in the same category and should be treated by philosophy in the same manner - ignored.
Single ideas or assertions (and those who pose them) have to justify themselves. They cannot borrow, loan or steal legitimacy by suggesting that other ideas are less than perfect. Another variety of not accepting responsibility is called a Tu quo que, a 'You-too!' response, a tactic often used by spouses, politicians and irascible children to evade criticism by casting ones own. Why should I address my own inadequacies if I can give the impression that others are just as incapable as I? Almost no philosopher claims that mechanistic models are perfect or that 'science can know everything' and I can't recall any but the overtly delusional who claim it has no utility. Moreover Francis Crick's claim that 'vitalism' would die was also just hyperbole. He meant to say that the concept has no validity but vitalism is a supernatural concept, a belief, a product (for all we know) of what psychology has labelled 'magical thinking'. It can never 'die' because it never 'lived' in the first place. This projection, ironically, is part of the naturally selected cognitive ability to produce causal links between our ideas and reality. It's how a mind naturally thinks and is also what philosophy calls a causal (logical) fallacy. It is obsessive compulsive disorders 'thought action fusion' or Dennett's philosophically elaborated 'intentional stance'. 'I see this and feel that, therefore this caused that.' And since what a human feels is their own intentions we project or inject imaginary intentions into the rest of reality. Things are not just uncertain or somewhat random, fate, the Universe and its (suspiciously human like) Cause has actual (mysterious) plans for me. There's a Hand of God or one of my favourites, a 'Fickle Finger (of Fate)'. Mountains 'move' in reaction to belief (faith) which rather beggars the question as to why it can't weather a few simple criticisms (or cartoons). But I digress...
This trait allows us the Fast Thinking, the heuristic mental shortcutting described by Kahneman and Tversky together with the enjoyment of theatre, the use of metaphor, story and song. It's what permits us to be 'lost within' imagined worlds or 'carried away' by emotion. It can also lead to considerable bias and the production of beliefs unsupported by anything but the belief itself. It is why we have a not entirely unique but increased ability to mimic, negotiate, lie and deceive. Cognition's tendency towards confirmation (overconfidence effects) can leverage the probability of short term success and produce dogmatism, the 'heels in the dirt' response to the very attitude of critical thinking. 'Perfect theories' do not require intellectual flexibility or revision of belief in accord with compelling evidence. They need to avoid it. What seems to be actually duelling or competing with vitalism is a function of the evolutionarily newer executive centres of the brains cortex, thinking itself. The belief in vitalism only requires the defence of preexisting intuitively naive but compelling feelings confirmed by the same overwhelming emotion and the abandonment of reason and even imagination. Vitalism requires a 'child's' mind.
What Lacks Imagination?
One argument against revision is that maintaining vague or overtly supernatural concepts as if they helped explain reality is 'more' imaginative. Philosopher Peter Boghossian argues that this sort of 'imagined explanation' (faith thinking) would be better defined as 'pretending to know what we do not', labelling ignoroance so it looks like knowledge. So the converse appears to be true. In the millennia before the development of a modern scientific method what the unaided human mind tended to imagine was a great deal of superstition (it still does) which involved various forms of gruesome sacrifice which were, in themselves, proposed solutions within an explanatory framework (of supernaturalism). What we felt was true also couldn't be verified unless it was with further applications of 'revealed' (tribal) knowledge. Philosophy or technology didn't change for tens of thousands of years for this reason, not a lack of imagination but almost no interruption of it.
We can harness our imagination (now that we have the benefit of that hindsight) to imagine the relative knowledge vacuum of the past, a time when even those with the highest IQ's knew less than a 6 year old (due to the simple absence of knowledge about the most basic (by today's standards) of facts). The earth appears quite flat and at the centre of reality and it is this explanation that most humans still accept as being a part of a credible explanation for reality (most humans are members of the 4 large religions all of which still hold that their texts are irrefutable. All four assert cosmologies which are mythical). This 'reality' of 20,000 (or 200,000 or 1,000,000) years ago is a mix of predictable and the quite unexpected (our lower brains ability to become hyper-vigilant with repeated exposure to threat exists (in the fashion it does) for this very natural reason). But the only explanations I have are whatever I feel is true and what I feel is true is a mixture of emotion and traditional explanations (what my tribe taught me was true (based upon what they feel is true)). Natural selection has given me senses geared to react but the same heightened self protectionism, and it's strong tendency to be wary of others who do not appear like me also (irony again) gives me the impression that I am not 'like them', not 'just' an animal. Most of my species is still bewildered and offended to be identified as one because it is easy to be convinced otherwise. On a personal note, when my children were in primary school they once referred to 'Animals'. I said 'Do you mean 'other animals?' Both were perplexed. 'No, Dad. Animals. You know?' 'What are we?' I replied. 'Humans' replied the younger one. 'And what are they?' The older one replied 'A species of animal.' It has been far easier for them to navigate their way through other complex problems (academic and life) by first examining an epistemology that simply invited the 'intuitvely appealing.' As I note below (and as my daughter later demonstrated) and as biological theory informs us, it is not actually possible to 'get rid of' the teleological impulse (we cannot amputate evolution).
Back to my natural ability to anticipate. It allows me to wonder, logically, about the size of the creature which, to my senses, could make the earth shake, winds howl, death and life itself. Without any basic knowledge about physical forces, the sun and its effects on Earth's atmosphere, without the most elementary facts and understanding of biology (robust explanations), the only logical conclusion is that super-powerful intentional forces (just like the other much smaller intentional creatures around me) are explanatory - real. Moreover, my explanation (perception of what explains events) is now based not only in incomprehension but necessarily more reliant upon fear and apprehension (of the explanation itself!). I simultaneously need to act in what I feel is accordance. This includes all others who would put me at risk by further irritating, unbalancing, annoying or disappointing the 'explanation'. This is how strikingly disabling of intellect and ethic such ideas can be due to their being established and maintained by ignorance itself. It is clear that the human mind is largely incapable of building reliable knowledge with pure imagination unaided by formalized and robust epistemologies such as a scientific method. If a person admits that their gut, faith or intuition is the pinnacle of knowledge, then at least we understand that we are dealing with nature itself in full protective flight. Since complex thinking arose with language development even today we observe, in the expression of quaint Utopian beliefs such as vitalism, the language of 'infancy'.
How can we assist and develop thinking about how we think?
How can we assist and develop thinking about how we think?
Useful Simple Analogies
A useful analogy is to imagine a see-saw (teeter-totter). In order for one idea to 'overbalance' another we require more than just having what we feel to be a competing idea. If I sit on one side my imaginary friend (IF) literally won't provide the evidence required to 'balance the scales' or add legitimacy to it's own existence. IF's can't actually be made real by feeling 'congruent' about them. We might find emotionally compelling arguments as to why the IF might be there, but without any evidence we stretch credibility for the claim beyond a reasonable point. There must be something more than repetitions of wish thinking to call it philosophy. It is no longer a valid argument nor a credible claim that what we want to be true is the basis of either philosophy or science. There is a great deal to be borrowed from pure metaphysics but it is verifiably unwise to regard pure imagination as its own total method of revelation. Try teaching a child to cross a road using their imagination and we suddenly discover (or ignore) the fact that we do not employ such (epistemological) tactics. And we do not offer the excuse that it's a 'different type of knowledge'. We do not because we sense the danger in it. I have become acquainted with the ability of people to refuse even this simple, obvious and honest test of reason. But we can understand it as the mind doing what natural selection gave it - epistemically magical escape hatches for our cherished beliefs. In philosophy we call it 'special pleading'. Our argument is made robust by just ignoring reasoning or evidence which doesn't support it. In the case of vitalisms all we need provide is the fact that the argument is supported only by story and opinion.
We can even extend the analogy. It is not uncommon to find people who believe that ghosts are real. When asked, some even offer that they not only believe but know. How do they know? They just do is a typical reply. Do they accept that ghosts are difficult if not impossible to see? Yes. Then is it wise to claim to know of the existence of something that no one can see (even when sight is extended through instrumentation (such as microscopes and the Large Hadron Collider) empiricism is not merely via the unaided senses these days)). People have often heard the phrase 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence', an intuitively convincing collection of words. It means that just because we can't 'see' something it doesn't mean it isn't there. It happens all the time. If I can't 'see' my wife I can't determine if she is there or not. But is this even remotely cogent, powerfully true, or just superficially truish? If I cannot see a pink elephant should my claim that there is one be considered sound? If I (or anyone else) cannot see their god (which is usually metaphorically dwelling in their heart or mind or soul), is that a claim that we would regard as in any way 'solid', sound, valid, worthy of respect? Let's test it shall we.
Back at the corner of the road, I am about to teach little Doug that just because he has no evidence of oncoming traffic that isn't dangerous it doesn't mean all traffic is dangerous. Perhaps some traffic can hit you but it will not harm you. We can apply that to atomic particles but can we apply it broadly, without justification? Or can we just roll out the same phrase as if it applies to every situation? Let's make it easier. Little Doug looks and detects no oncoming traffic. Is he wise to assume he cannot trust his own senses? How else might he check? What if he can imagine no traffic? Is he justifed in crossing? He might study the reactions of other pedestrians or source past experience (of oncoming traffic and how he recognised it). Does Little Doug think 'just because I can't see oncoming traffic doesn't mean that today it's not invisible.' Given the sense of (intuitively appealling) profundity of this epistemology, not only can Little Doug use it (whimsy) as a method to cross a busy road, he can consider it moral and virtuous, since so much of what is claimed to be of great or perfect morality involves simply making the claim based upon circular arguments but requiring the tabling of absolutely no evidence other than petitions that it's indeed a great and virtuous approach (to solving complex problems). Putting aside the obvious offences felt at having ones unreliable epistemologies exposed as naive wish thinking, our attention should turn to the welfare of children. Even if the problem at hand is not immediately, obviously a dangerous one, we can assume the epistemology to be. Such naive reasoning is dangerous when applied to apparently mundane problems. Why should it become safe, wise or moral merely because the problem appears 'different'?
We can even extend the analogy. It is not uncommon to find people who believe that ghosts are real. When asked, some even offer that they not only believe but know. How do they know? They just do is a typical reply. Do they accept that ghosts are difficult if not impossible to see? Yes. Then is it wise to claim to know of the existence of something that no one can see (even when sight is extended through instrumentation (such as microscopes and the Large Hadron Collider) empiricism is not merely via the unaided senses these days)). People have often heard the phrase 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence', an intuitively convincing collection of words. It means that just because we can't 'see' something it doesn't mean it isn't there. It happens all the time. If I can't 'see' my wife I can't determine if she is there or not. But is this even remotely cogent, powerfully true, or just superficially truish? If I cannot see a pink elephant should my claim that there is one be considered sound? If I (or anyone else) cannot see their god (which is usually metaphorically dwelling in their heart or mind or soul), is that a claim that we would regard as in any way 'solid', sound, valid, worthy of respect? Let's test it shall we.
Back at the corner of the road, I am about to teach little Doug that just because he has no evidence of oncoming traffic that isn't dangerous it doesn't mean all traffic is dangerous. Perhaps some traffic can hit you but it will not harm you. We can apply that to atomic particles but can we apply it broadly, without justification? Or can we just roll out the same phrase as if it applies to every situation? Let's make it easier. Little Doug looks and detects no oncoming traffic. Is he wise to assume he cannot trust his own senses? How else might he check? What if he can imagine no traffic? Is he justifed in crossing? He might study the reactions of other pedestrians or source past experience (of oncoming traffic and how he recognised it). Does Little Doug think 'just because I can't see oncoming traffic doesn't mean that today it's not invisible.' Given the sense of (intuitively appealling) profundity of this epistemology, not only can Little Doug use it (whimsy) as a method to cross a busy road, he can consider it moral and virtuous, since so much of what is claimed to be of great or perfect morality involves simply making the claim based upon circular arguments but requiring the tabling of absolutely no evidence other than petitions that it's indeed a great and virtuous approach (to solving complex problems). Putting aside the obvious offences felt at having ones unreliable epistemologies exposed as naive wish thinking, our attention should turn to the welfare of children. Even if the problem at hand is not immediately, obviously a dangerous one, we can assume the epistemology to be. Such naive reasoning is dangerous when applied to apparently mundane problems. Why should it become safe, wise or moral merely because the problem appears 'different'?
Back to the see-saw. All the supporters of the IF may claim otherwise but popularity (in isolation) cannot determine it. Similarly it requires real people to cross real finish lines to be awarded real medals. Popular but apparently non existent entries are not. There must be real, literal 'weight' to a claim, something a great deal more than just a claim. Test your own willingness to be truly 'open-minded'. How would you feel to be convicted of a crime due to the testimony of a person or entity that only seemed to exist as a popular or ancient idea? That is the level of reason required to maintain the claim that vitalism be considered a good idea, an explanation for anything, at all. This chief argument of popularity, for why we should regard vitalism as explanatory (actual knowledge) employs little more than conflation, hiding the lack of an idea in language that looks like thinking. If we feel that the words 'holism' or 'emergence', like 'vitalism' or the quite unimaginative 'neo (new) -vitalism' explain something it will. We then assume that popularity is equivalent to 'true' whereas it is a simple fallacy of logic, an imprecision, vague, bullshit. 'Perfect', (like 'Optimal') is overwhelmingly used as an adjective or verb, metaphorically. Even as a noun it is usually 'common' and if 'proper' describes those ideas we are unable to locate or identify IE Perfect Morality). Vitalism then is at best a somewhat useful allegory but historically it has one very strict definition. It is one of the many superseded scientific theories. Like preformation, ethers and geocentricity the idea that biology was explained 'vitalistically' has failed for over 200 years to provide any understanding for why any part of biology behaves in the manner it does. Moreover, if failed explanations are used as if they are still (or ever were) valid, provides the illusion of knowledge and no real motivation to recognize forgery or acquire the genuine article. Unfortunately it does provide all the motivation one needs for the steady reinforcement of ones own bias and a marked cessation of any need to learn. Learning by definition assumes not only the possibility but the high probability that one will encounter dis-confirming evidence of ones cherished beliefs. If one is convinced through habituation that they can produce knowledge through the defence of strongly held conviction alone (apologetics) we are probably describing faith, not science nor even a robust philosophy. Vitalism can only be maintained as a description of biology through circularity, by the very rejection of the rules of evidence or reason. Vitalism is the opportunity or excuse to stop thinking altogether.
Falsified Theory
The most significant discovery by our own species was the revelation that all of life was moulded by a process called evolution. But it was evolution's theory, natural selection, that produced the only real 'controversy', a deeply social (and ironically behavioural) one. It appears that humans, once convinced of the truth that perfection is real and achievable (heavens, vital forces, etc) do not appreciate having those ideas and feelings dis-confirmed by facts. It may be awkward but ethical to have to mention the fact that 6 day cosmologies and 2 person (one formed from a rib) species productions do not represent either metaphorically or literally true explanations for reality. They describe failed attempts. That we have to argue these and other points is a distraction. If a child continued to claim that their demand for sweets was sound (because they believed that sweet eating was congruent with their philosophy) would we enter into that discussion? As a consequence scientific education (and education and academia in general) has to weather a continual storm of lobbying to have the species own 'story' modified, sanitized, expurgated or entirely banned. The teaching of vitalism (which aligns with the creationist 'Intelligent Design' (chiropractic philosophy uses the label Universal Intelligence) within chiropractic education, whether overtly or through a hidden curriculum, achieves the same level of distortion. As implied in the 'childish' example there are not multiple competing theories in the case of biology, just one falsifiable (and considerably supported) one. We do have a great deal of speculative nonsense from people who don't like the fact that no ones brand of creator has ever been located for comment.
For example, my own year 11 daughters 500 page biology text (part of the national Australian curriculum), mentions evolution via natural selection once (4 words). Evolution is mentioned in previous years but there is no accompanying discussion of its considerable scientific or philosophical implications, certainly no mention that it is the overarching explanatory framework, a constant reference point without which any interpretation of biological behavior is rendered a matter of personal preference. An analogy would be a year 11 mathematics curriculum that never mentioned theory or the formula associated with it. Theory would get a brief mention in year 7 perhaps. We would then be left with data, such as numbers representing quantities however given the absence of a framework, students could choose to interpret mathematical problems in whatever way they felt was 'congruent' with their feelings or 'philosophy'. 'Philosophically congruent' is another whimsical but vague concept. It produces the impression that provided an idea feels true it also comprises a robust philosophy. And ironically again, we now know this particular behavior (and the language) to be nothing but an illustration of 'confirmation bias'. Why revise a belief when we can rename the delusion? Would we accept as rational any individual who claimed to be an 'expert mathematican' who utilised or abandoned the need for formulae based upon personal preference or 'congruence'? In any other field of science, theory is used to interpret or filter observations. If the incorrect formula is used the solutions become inconsistent or incomprehensible. But if the rule becomes inconsistenccy (personal preference) the very idea of fact or truth is irrelevant and even impossible. Philosopher Daniel Dennett opinioned that this, doing away with truth altogether, may well be an actual 'evil'. And the absurdity is that if we claim truth to be dead, how do we know that to be true? The idea deserves no thought since it is already without it.
Any legitimate theory can be tested/falsified in principle. Perfect 'theory' is metaphor at best, not investigable and philosophically immune from revision by definition. Therefore any supernatural concept is not and cannot be a part of the scientific endeavour by definition. Its use only leads to misinterpretation, a continued lack of understanding and the cessation of any real progress. That people often reject the implications of natural selection is 'perfectly' understandable. We grasp that life is fragile and brief. Who would not be intuitively drawn to the prospect of escaping reality - for real! But in order to accomplish this feat of rationalization we have to agree to continue to lie to successive generations of children that peace, knowledge and understanding is ultimately out of their hands (supernatural traditions are often overtly anti-intellectual for this very reason). They simply have to submit to whatever story tends to make other people feel 'congruent' and comfortable, particularly whoever holds a controlling influence over us (note that myth simply reflects primitive or tribal forms of government). Like our ancestors, we must insist that children never grow up because it frightens us.
Any legitimate theory can be tested/falsified in principle. Perfect 'theory' is metaphor at best, not investigable and philosophically immune from revision by definition. Therefore any supernatural concept is not and cannot be a part of the scientific endeavour by definition. Its use only leads to misinterpretation, a continued lack of understanding and the cessation of any real progress. That people often reject the implications of natural selection is 'perfectly' understandable. We grasp that life is fragile and brief. Who would not be intuitively drawn to the prospect of escaping reality - for real! But in order to accomplish this feat of rationalization we have to agree to continue to lie to successive generations of children that peace, knowledge and understanding is ultimately out of their hands (supernatural traditions are often overtly anti-intellectual for this very reason). They simply have to submit to whatever story tends to make other people feel 'congruent' and comfortable, particularly whoever holds a controlling influence over us (note that myth simply reflects primitive or tribal forms of government). Like our ancestors, we must insist that children never grow up because it frightens us.
"The methodology of optimal control is applicable when there is (i) a single, known cost function to be optimized, (ii) an invertible model of the plant, and (iii) simple noise interfering with optimal performance. None of these is likely to be true for biological organisms..." (Loeb)
A simple objective observation of the literature concerning biology and neurology notes a few important points. 1. The entire theoretical framework, without which we will struggle to understand biology is the fact of evolution via natural selection. If that is ever falsified it cannot (legitimately) be replaced by tribal whimsy (For example, in Turkey it is against the law to teach natural selection, even evolution. In Australia and other countries it is simply largely omitted) 2. That process tends to build biological systems which are hierarchical but dependant and highly redundant. Biological systems are observed to interact both with themselves and their external environments using 'good enough' strategies. 'They' do not behave as if they are able to locate a single cost function to be optimized. We can test observations and the framework itself by asking, hypothetically, what a 'perfect' neurology would look like. It would seek to reach just that, perfection. It would seek an unobtainable, a metaphorical. As theory, 'perfection' results in naive, ridiculous, magical and childish interpretations. Even homeostasis is the description of imperfection, of 'good enough' not optimal or vitalistic biological states. Optimal would only fire single pathways in response to single stimuli which, once 'optimized', would never change (another irony (and contradiction) is that practitioners who tend to employ naive 'perfect' concepts also err towards the premise that care need be regular and for the term of ones (imperfect) life). But the nature of life is that natural forces (and the stimuli they are transduced into (and back again)) arrive in constant fluctuating (predictably unpredictable) multiples. And since that is the reality we observe around us (and the type of neurology we see (EG inhibition/excitation) the most efficient strategy to be naturally selected (and therefore produced by evolution) is to have no 'best startegy' (but multiple, mouldable, plastic overlapping ones) as the 'best'. Most people are familiar with the drab sounding 'feedback loop' but it's important to understand that most of biology is just that - massess of interweaving 'correction systems' due to the fact that none of it is 'perfect'. But it is far easier to feel that we 'understand' such complexity by using 'vitalistic palceholders' and substituting them for knowledge.
Conspiracy Theorism
In a Scientific American article titled 'Why people oppose GMOs (genetically modified organisms) even though science says they are safe' (August 2015), the authors note that intuitions can encourage opinions that are contrary to the facts. The question is why? The author and colleagues identify 'essentialism', the idea that every entity has a special something without which it has no 'essential' identity. They also note that individuals who use intuitively appealing (essentialist 'vitalistic causation' 'naive biology') and that negative representations of GMOs are "widespread and compelling because they are intuitively appealing".
"Intuitions about purposes and intentions also have an impact on people’s thinking about GMOs. They render us vulnerable to the idea that purely natural phenomena exist or happen for a purpose that is intended by some agent. These assumptions are part and parcel of religious beliefs, but in secular environments they lead people to regard nature as a beneficial process or entity that secures our wellbeing and that humans shouldn’t meddle with. In the context of opposition to GMOs, genetic modification is deemed “unnatural” and biotechnologists are accused of “playing God”. The popular term “Frankenfood” captures what is at stake: by going against the will of nature in an act of hubris, we are bound to bring enormous disaster upon ourselves."
Vitalism is one of these 'essential' or intuitively appealing ideas that awards credulity and invites distrust and paranoia with respect to any narrative that isn't intuitively appealing. The scientific method itself has been so successful a thinking tool because it is counter intuitive. It is designed in a type of cognitively backwards fashion. Science methods technically try to 'break' hypotheses through testing them. Cognition, in order to be rapid, operates via confirmation bias, rapid guesswork using limited data then back filled later by what appears to be confirming 'evidence' (whether it actually is or not). The emotionless language of good research is also not accidental since it is trying to limit bias and rhetorical language is 'loose'. So should we reject metaphor?
One of the hallmarks of great theory is its elegance (as opposed to simple naivety). 'It is a misconception to view natural selection as a process that perfects organisms. At the opposite extreme, natural selection is sometimes interpreted as a random process." But it is most elegantly (and accurately, factually) described as "a population of organisms (which) undergoes random mutation and non-random selection. The result is non-random evolutionary change". It then requires the hard work of thinking, as opposed to the effortlessly intuitively appealing (and ordinarily selfish) in order to begin to understand not only biology or life, but ourselves and each other. The willingness to do so could be called ethics.
The 'Sneer' of Reality
In 2009 the now head of the chiropractic professions largest institution, Rob Scott of Life University down in the bible belt of Georgia, USA explained his understanding of vitalism (and thereby his idea of what constitutes being professionally 'evidence based'. He chose to refer to the opinions of Astrophysicist Bernard Haisch, author of The God Theory, Proof of God and The Purpose Guided Universe. Haisch is a proponent of the Fine-Tuning argument. Because the physical properties of the universe allow for life (so it goes) it must point to only one conclusion - an intelligent being made it like that. Without going into detail what at first appears to be remarkably compelling isn't quite so mesmerizing when examined. Most of the universe is overtly hostile to life which itself hangs on precariously. Most species (and almost all potential individuals) are extinct. We have no idea if Earth is the only example, in the whole vast universe, of life having had the chance to get going. The universe is expanding and cooling as it does so. As an aside, one argument that this simply can't be the case is that the presence of life excludes it. Techincially it depends upon maintaining that the second law of thermodynamics is wrong. If everything is cooling off (entropy) then why do we have life?!! The reason is because all open systems tend towards cooling off. Earth is a 'closed' system, at least temporarily (by cosmological standards). The fact that the universe has certain properties doesn't mean they are 'fine-tuned' it's that to humans it appears that way. If the properties were otherwise and life never began there would be no humans present to claim otherwise. Haisch also defends his claims by first painting the false dilemma:
""Somewhere between a hard core reductionist who explains all things as the sum of their parts and greets every suggestion of spirituality with a sneer, and the unquestioning faithful who receive their beliefs from the prophets and preachers, there is a group of philosophical centrists, well-intentioned, open-minded and skeptical yet eager to explore their own nature”. This conference is for them – the excluded middle ground of vitalism – the philosophical centrists..." (Rob Scott quoting Bernard Haisch)
Paint a false dichotomy (the illusion that only two 'extremes' exist) - 'Somewhere between'
Attack both illusions (making particular effort to demonise the one which threatens us the most) - the 'hard core' (sneering) reductionist and the (blind) faithful (because our brand of faith is rational)
Award oneself the moral high ground - the "well-intentioned, open-minded and skeptical yet eager..."
If the goal is to truly elevate the entire concept of knowledge building (and all along with it) the strategy is not to first create tribal and unnecessary divisions. If the objective is to understand reality a little better than before what point is there in placing our own identity (and it's subjective opinions) at the pinnacle of what should be regarded as true? My daughter is currently studying philosophy at high school. Her latest assignment is for her group to come to a decision as to what they regard as being 'Reality'. Their conclusion, a perfectly natural one, a naively vitalisitc one, is to conclude that reality is that which conforms with what they personally perceive to be real. It's circular. As soon as we examine it it is juts that, an intuitively compelling but false assumption. For example, if what is real/true is whatever we perceive then who's to say anyone ever failed or passed a mathematics test? There is no right and wrong, no need for rules, models or any type of knowledge since everything can be classified as such (many ways of knowledge). In her year (9), this exercise is part of introducing students to discourse - asking questions and thinking about them - not an exploration into complex ideas. But interestingly it actually confirmed, yet again, the theory of natural selection - the mind is built for efficiency, for rapidly identifying as true that which feels compellingly so. Haisch and Scott and all who cling to vitalisms as if they were explanatory cling to nothing but childish thinking. That is also naturally and simplistically perceived as a 'hard core' sneer from a narrow minded reductionist, little more than a bully. The explanation however is that we are informing someone that their perception of having achieved an 'A' is not a reflection of reality. It is just a simple fact that they failed the exam. A few years back I had a brief discussion with a colleague, Simon Senzon, who fancies himself as a philosopher. I'll grant that he has by far a better memory and persistence than I seem to be able to muster but one of the first things he said to me (wrote) was 'Don't tell me my ideas are half baked.' I was taken aback for a few reasons. If a person is secure in their views would they need to warn their interlocutor not to reply in whichever way they thought fit? It seemed childish and I should have been careful not to reply in the affirmative. Surely he has noticed something suspect? His 'philosophy' at the time (integral methodological pluaralism) was well intentioned and made as much philosophical sense as any year 9 group consensus. In his model what was knowledge was whatever someone wanted to call it. 'Pluralism' as a method (a type of epistemology (at least 8 in fact so take your pick!)) is formalising childish wish thinking. If you want something to be true just make the claim and voila! Avoid all good advice, such as Occam's Razor (err to the 'simple' (elegant) explanation, not the verbose). But it is actually potentially dangerous for adults to believe such reasoning demonstrates more than stupidity or selfishness. I should not have said 'Yes, I do think it's half baked.' I was quite wrong. It was far worse than just silly. It was unquestionably selfish and unethical to teach adult humans that truth, knowledge can be established just by wishing hard enough and that evidence was whatever we found to be emotionally attractive.
Established and Maintained Through Faith
It's then little surprise that each 'theory' that claims to encompass all knowledge, like any theory of everything, explains nothing at all except our desire to feel emotionally vindicated. A good analogy is to imagine watching a person making random leaps (which represents the style of reasoning, the randomness of our epistemology) between stepping stones (which represent the separate claims or statements that go together when we think through our beliefs). Before we begin we don't even know if the stepping stones are real or illusory. We have to want to test them for validity to see if they 'hold weight'. Let's say a stepping stone is made from the claim that nerve cells transmit signals using a combination of electrical and chemical processes. Before we can proceed to a larger discussion as to how an entire central nervous system works we'd have to work out this single step. We can't just say that we feel as though there's something 'other than' or 'more than just' physical forces at play without being able to examine that claim. If we say 'this step is explained through physical forces (and something extra I'll call vitalism)' we are proceeding with our thinking by using faith to plug gaps in our understanding. And if this is not pointed out early we get into the habit of plugging any knowledge hole with imaginary knowledge, what Daniel Dennett calls 'Wonder Tissue'. Wonder Tissue can make fake stepping stones as well as provide imaginary connections between them by cobbling together facts, fictions and colourful language. With practice we won't even recognise that we are perfecting the art of pseudo-profound bullshitting to ourselves and others.
Beliefs such as the existence of vitalism are established and maintained through using faith as the epistemological wonder tissue. Raw intuition or faith (hoping or trusting that what you believe is true) can arrive at a conclusion which is possibly true OR possibly false but it cannot discern between them. This is why vitalism or any supernatural claim has multiple definitions, because faith alone is a self-reinforcing guess which has no discernment, an unreliable method for building knowledge. Therefore, in choosing to hold onto the belief that vitalism represents a description of reality we are choosing an unreliable epistemology. The question itself is quite distinct from whatever belief it is which sits at the centre of a claim. It could be that vitalism is true OR that it is false, but if we are using a method that is unreliable all we have to rely on is the hope that what we've guessed is true. It is no more complicated than this.
In a Scientific American article titled 'Why people oppose GMOs (genetically modified organisms) even though science says they are safe' (August 2015), the authors note that intuitions can encourage opinions that are contrary to the facts. The question is why? The author and colleagues identify 'essentialism', the idea that every entity has a special something without which it has no 'essential' identity. They also note that individuals who use intuitively appealing (essentialist 'vitalistic causation' 'naive biology') and that negative representations of GMOs are "widespread and compelling because they are intuitively appealing".
"Intuitions about purposes and intentions also have an impact on people’s thinking about GMOs. They render us vulnerable to the idea that purely natural phenomena exist or happen for a purpose that is intended by some agent. These assumptions are part and parcel of religious beliefs, but in secular environments they lead people to regard nature as a beneficial process or entity that secures our wellbeing and that humans shouldn’t meddle with. In the context of opposition to GMOs, genetic modification is deemed “unnatural” and biotechnologists are accused of “playing God”. The popular term “Frankenfood” captures what is at stake: by going against the will of nature in an act of hubris, we are bound to bring enormous disaster upon ourselves."
Vitalism is one of these 'essential' or intuitively appealing ideas that awards credulity and invites distrust and paranoia with respect to any narrative that isn't intuitively appealing. The scientific method itself has been so successful a thinking tool because it is counter intuitive. It is designed in a type of cognitively backwards fashion. Science methods technically try to 'break' hypotheses through testing them. Cognition, in order to be rapid, operates via confirmation bias, rapid guesswork using limited data then back filled later by what appears to be confirming 'evidence' (whether it actually is or not). The emotionless language of good research is also not accidental since it is trying to limit bias and rhetorical language is 'loose'. So should we reject metaphor?
One of the hallmarks of great theory is its elegance (as opposed to simple naivety). 'It is a misconception to view natural selection as a process that perfects organisms. At the opposite extreme, natural selection is sometimes interpreted as a random process." But it is most elegantly (and accurately, factually) described as "a population of organisms (which) undergoes random mutation and non-random selection. The result is non-random evolutionary change". It then requires the hard work of thinking, as opposed to the effortlessly intuitively appealing (and ordinarily selfish) in order to begin to understand not only biology or life, but ourselves and each other. The willingness to do so could be called ethics.
The 'Sneer' of Reality
In 2009 the now head of the chiropractic professions largest institution, Rob Scott of Life University down in the bible belt of Georgia, USA explained his understanding of vitalism (and thereby his idea of what constitutes being professionally 'evidence based'. He chose to refer to the opinions of Astrophysicist Bernard Haisch, author of The God Theory, Proof of God and The Purpose Guided Universe. Haisch is a proponent of the Fine-Tuning argument. Because the physical properties of the universe allow for life (so it goes) it must point to only one conclusion - an intelligent being made it like that. Without going into detail what at first appears to be remarkably compelling isn't quite so mesmerizing when examined. Most of the universe is overtly hostile to life which itself hangs on precariously. Most species (and almost all potential individuals) are extinct. We have no idea if Earth is the only example, in the whole vast universe, of life having had the chance to get going. The universe is expanding and cooling as it does so. As an aside, one argument that this simply can't be the case is that the presence of life excludes it. Techincially it depends upon maintaining that the second law of thermodynamics is wrong. If everything is cooling off (entropy) then why do we have life?!! The reason is because all open systems tend towards cooling off. Earth is a 'closed' system, at least temporarily (by cosmological standards). The fact that the universe has certain properties doesn't mean they are 'fine-tuned' it's that to humans it appears that way. If the properties were otherwise and life never began there would be no humans present to claim otherwise. Haisch also defends his claims by first painting the false dilemma:
""Somewhere between a hard core reductionist who explains all things as the sum of their parts and greets every suggestion of spirituality with a sneer, and the unquestioning faithful who receive their beliefs from the prophets and preachers, there is a group of philosophical centrists, well-intentioned, open-minded and skeptical yet eager to explore their own nature”. This conference is for them – the excluded middle ground of vitalism – the philosophical centrists..." (Rob Scott quoting Bernard Haisch)
Paint a false dichotomy (the illusion that only two 'extremes' exist) - 'Somewhere between'
Attack both illusions (making particular effort to demonise the one which threatens us the most) - the 'hard core' (sneering) reductionist and the (blind) faithful (because our brand of faith is rational)
Award oneself the moral high ground - the "well-intentioned, open-minded and skeptical yet eager..."
If the goal is to truly elevate the entire concept of knowledge building (and all along with it) the strategy is not to first create tribal and unnecessary divisions. If the objective is to understand reality a little better than before what point is there in placing our own identity (and it's subjective opinions) at the pinnacle of what should be regarded as true? My daughter is currently studying philosophy at high school. Her latest assignment is for her group to come to a decision as to what they regard as being 'Reality'. Their conclusion, a perfectly natural one, a naively vitalisitc one, is to conclude that reality is that which conforms with what they personally perceive to be real. It's circular. As soon as we examine it it is juts that, an intuitively compelling but false assumption. For example, if what is real/true is whatever we perceive then who's to say anyone ever failed or passed a mathematics test? There is no right and wrong, no need for rules, models or any type of knowledge since everything can be classified as such (many ways of knowledge). In her year (9), this exercise is part of introducing students to discourse - asking questions and thinking about them - not an exploration into complex ideas. But interestingly it actually confirmed, yet again, the theory of natural selection - the mind is built for efficiency, for rapidly identifying as true that which feels compellingly so. Haisch and Scott and all who cling to vitalisms as if they were explanatory cling to nothing but childish thinking. That is also naturally and simplistically perceived as a 'hard core' sneer from a narrow minded reductionist, little more than a bully. The explanation however is that we are informing someone that their perception of having achieved an 'A' is not a reflection of reality. It is just a simple fact that they failed the exam. A few years back I had a brief discussion with a colleague, Simon Senzon, who fancies himself as a philosopher. I'll grant that he has by far a better memory and persistence than I seem to be able to muster but one of the first things he said to me (wrote) was 'Don't tell me my ideas are half baked.' I was taken aback for a few reasons. If a person is secure in their views would they need to warn their interlocutor not to reply in whichever way they thought fit? It seemed childish and I should have been careful not to reply in the affirmative. Surely he has noticed something suspect? His 'philosophy' at the time (integral methodological pluaralism) was well intentioned and made as much philosophical sense as any year 9 group consensus. In his model what was knowledge was whatever someone wanted to call it. 'Pluralism' as a method (a type of epistemology (at least 8 in fact so take your pick!)) is formalising childish wish thinking. If you want something to be true just make the claim and voila! Avoid all good advice, such as Occam's Razor (err to the 'simple' (elegant) explanation, not the verbose). But it is actually potentially dangerous for adults to believe such reasoning demonstrates more than stupidity or selfishness. I should not have said 'Yes, I do think it's half baked.' I was quite wrong. It was far worse than just silly. It was unquestionably selfish and unethical to teach adult humans that truth, knowledge can be established just by wishing hard enough and that evidence was whatever we found to be emotionally attractive.
Established and Maintained Through Faith
It's then little surprise that each 'theory' that claims to encompass all knowledge, like any theory of everything, explains nothing at all except our desire to feel emotionally vindicated. A good analogy is to imagine watching a person making random leaps (which represents the style of reasoning, the randomness of our epistemology) between stepping stones (which represent the separate claims or statements that go together when we think through our beliefs). Before we begin we don't even know if the stepping stones are real or illusory. We have to want to test them for validity to see if they 'hold weight'. Let's say a stepping stone is made from the claim that nerve cells transmit signals using a combination of electrical and chemical processes. Before we can proceed to a larger discussion as to how an entire central nervous system works we'd have to work out this single step. We can't just say that we feel as though there's something 'other than' or 'more than just' physical forces at play without being able to examine that claim. If we say 'this step is explained through physical forces (and something extra I'll call vitalism)' we are proceeding with our thinking by using faith to plug gaps in our understanding. And if this is not pointed out early we get into the habit of plugging any knowledge hole with imaginary knowledge, what Daniel Dennett calls 'Wonder Tissue'. Wonder Tissue can make fake stepping stones as well as provide imaginary connections between them by cobbling together facts, fictions and colourful language. With practice we won't even recognise that we are perfecting the art of pseudo-profound bullshitting to ourselves and others.
Beliefs such as the existence of vitalism are established and maintained through using faith as the epistemological wonder tissue. Raw intuition or faith (hoping or trusting that what you believe is true) can arrive at a conclusion which is possibly true OR possibly false but it cannot discern between them. This is why vitalism or any supernatural claim has multiple definitions, because faith alone is a self-reinforcing guess which has no discernment, an unreliable method for building knowledge. Therefore, in choosing to hold onto the belief that vitalism represents a description of reality we are choosing an unreliable epistemology. The question itself is quite distinct from whatever belief it is which sits at the centre of a claim. It could be that vitalism is true OR that it is false, but if we are using a method that is unreliable all we have to rely on is the hope that what we've guessed is true. It is no more complicated than this.
The ideas associated with vitalism represent an unsophisticated use of language. Not only does it require that one need not remain up to date with the contemporary literature, it operates in the 21st century as a facsimile for comprehension of actual biological and all behavioral knowledge. Since vitalism requires no more a sophisticated epistemology (knowledge building tool) than faith thinking, it reduces education to opinions, clinical practice to guru-ism and professionalism and patient education to streams of superficially entertaining but misleading and childish catchphrases. It turns health care into evangelism. Such ideas and the level of philosophy required to keep generating them (not to mention the political manipulation employed to enact a formal and hidden curriculum and protect it from criticism) has efficiently infantilised an entire profession, it's educational basis and even its comprehension of ethical duty.
DS
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